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On 3 February, the International Court of Justice ended a 16-year legal battle between Serbia and
Croatia by ruling that neither country was guilty of genocide during the Croatian War in the early
1990s. Denisa Kostovicova writes on the response to the ruling in both countries, and what it
means for attempts at reconciliation. She notes that while many of the responses highlighted some
of the key problems which have prevented reconciliation from taking place, there are nevertheless
some reasons to hope that the ruling could help draw a line under the conﬂict.
Last week, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) ruled that neither Serbia nor Croatia committed
genocide in the conﬂict in Croatia in the early 1990s. The Croatian war was one in a series of conﬂicts that
accompanied the violent dissolution of former Yugoslavia. The Court ruled that both Serbia and Croatia committed
serious crimes, but that speciﬁc genocidal intent was not established. The Court thus made a distinction between
ethnic cleansing and genocide.
The verdict brought to an end a 16-year long lawsuit
that started when Croatia ﬁled the claim in 1999,
accusing Serbia of targeting ethnic Croats. Serbia
ﬁled a counter-claim in 2010, accusing Croatia over
the expulsion of Serbs in 1995. The rejections of
Croatia’s claim and Serbia’s counter-claim – that
were widely expected even in Croatia and Serbia –
were hailed by international observers as the closing
of a particularly unlaudable chapter.
The lawsuit was a costly tit-for-tat played out by the
two sides at the top UN court. High political stakes
prevented settling the case. No side could be seen to
climb down after accusing the other of genocide. That
would have been tantamount to national betrayal.
Oﬃcial international reactions echoed the Court’s
appeal to Serbia and Croatia. It was spelled out in the
closing lines of the verdict, that they should ‘continue
their co-operation with a view to oﬀering appropriate
reparation to the victims of such violations, thus
consolidating peace and stability in the region.’
Welcoming the ICJ verdict, Eduard Kukan, Member of the European Parliament’s Committee on Foreign Aﬀairs, said
that Serbia and Croatia should work together ‘toward a lasting reconciliation’. Key to this, according to Kukan, is
ﬁnding ‘a new common ground, one not based on the wartime rhetoric and on the past, but one based on the future,
on the countries’ European path and on their joint eﬀort towards lasting peace and stability in the region.’
Serbian and Croatian reactions to the ICJ ruling ﬁt neatly into a pattern that shows why reconciliation in the region
has been elusive, some twenty years since the wars of the 1990s.
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A mirror image of local reaction
There was common ground between the reactions coming from Serbia and Croatia. Both leaderships accepted the
ruling. They also referred to the ‘future’ and ‘regional peace and stability’. Cynics might say that local leaders are
good students when it comes to saying the right thing for an international audience. Statements aimed for domestic
consumption bear this out.
The leaderships in both countries also shared their dissatisfaction with the ICJ ruling. Dissatisfaction stems from a
lack of recognition from the UN’s highest court of the degree of victimhood suﬀered by the two nations during the
conﬂict in Croatia. But, the sides did not reject the ruling ﬂatly because it was important for Croats and Serbs that
their suﬀering was recognised.
Furthermore, dissatisfaction was tempered by an approval of the Court’s dismissal of the other country’s claim of
genocide. Such reactions convey a belief of having achieved a successful defence of their interpretations of the
conﬂict. In the case of Croatia, the operation against the Serbs was a ‘legitimate military operation’, according to the
words of the country’s Justice Minister, Orsat Miljenic. However, local human rights NGOs criticised the oﬃcial
discourse that supports only ‘our cause’.
Overall, there was a lot of agreement in the reactions coming from Croatia and Serbia. But the agreement was not
of the sort that indicates readiness to come to grips with hard questions about their own nation’s criminal
responsibility. Both sides view the past, and, hence, the ICJ ruling, through an ethnic lens. This means that victims
are entitled to justice on the basis of their ethnicity and not on the basis of their suﬀering.
Dilemmas of reconciliation
Responses to the ICJ ruling revealed the political dynamics that have stood in the way of reconciliation in the
Balkans. While not leaving Croatia and Serbia with a clean slate, the ruling still oﬀers an opportunity to reassess
how reconciliation should be approached. This exercise may be instructive for the Balkan region as a whole. The
process is bound to be marked by two dilemmas: how to engage the European Union and how to identify a local
constituency for reconciliation.
Croatia became the 28th member of the European Union in 2013. Serbia is on its way to EU membership, having
been granted candidate status in 2012. Clearly, European integration has thus far not managed to do for Serbia and
Croatia what the European project did for Germany and France, only years after World War Two. They established
the European Coal and Steel Community in 1951, while Serbia and Croatia are now counting the decades after their
war.
While scholars discuss and disagree over the impact of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia
(ICTY), one fact is critique-proof. The international tribunal has prevented the denial of war crimes: a strategy which
appealed to post-war leaderships in the region.
The EU has played an important role in this process by introducing ICTY conditionality. The dynamics of European
integration of the Balkan states was linked to cooperation with the international tribunal, such as the extradition of
war crimes suspects. But the EU has much more to oﬀer and teach through its own example of post-conﬂict
reconciliation. With the EU’s vested interests in peace and security in the Balkans, it should lead to new thinking on
how to encourage the process. A focus on a society that worked so well for the EU may be a good starting point.
A lack of inter-ethnic rapprochement in the Balkans also reﬂects to a large extent both elites’ and civil society’s loss
of moral authority to lead reconciliation eﬀorts. Political elites have too often instrumentalised victims and their
suﬀering for their short-term political ends. Similarly, segments of civil society have proved to be ethnically-centred
(not unlike the elites), and grant-oriented rather than justice-oriented. So, who can be the EU’s partner in
reconciliation in the Balkans?
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There is no easy answer to this question, but the truth will out in diﬀerent shapes and forms – even in the Balkans.
Youngsters are querying their fathers in Bosnia-Herzegovina about what they did during the war; Albanian women
are confronting social stigma and putting the issues of war time rape in Kosovo on the agenda; and some Serbian
security oﬃcers are breaking their code of silence and speaking about the crimes committed by their units in
Kosovo.
These examples show that there is an alternative to the ethnic rhetoric coming from national elites and from
segments of civil society in the Balkans. This means that the socialisation of young generations into nationalist
interpretations of the conﬂict may be prevalent, but is by no means inevitable. The above examples also show that
there are local demands for justice. This means that there is a gap in our understanding of post-conﬂict justice in the
Balkans, which is based on supply and diﬀusion (as well as subversion) of international norms. Lastly, they show
that the passage of time does not dull the suﬀering and the quest for truth.
Unearthing and acknowledging what happened to all victims can lay the foundations of meaningful reconciliation.
This is the challenge that needs to be met for reconciliation in the Balkans to stand a chance.
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